How far did the war change
people`s attitudes about how
big a part a government should
play in peoples`s lives ?
(University College Northampton, England)
British war workers wearing gasmasks while loading shells with poisonous chemicals
“War” declared
Trotsky, “is the locomotive of history” (Bourne, 1989, p.191)
When considering the
attitude of the people towards the change governmental intervention had in
their lives, one must consider a number of different aspects.
The scene must firstly be set by ascertaining the mood of the people upon the outbreak of war, and this Bourne eloquently describes:
“The British
urban working class was the oldest industrial workforce in the world. Its
class-consciousness was very strong. It was well organised. It had a sharp
awareness of its industrial strength. It was quite remarkably strike-prone. It
was also riven with divisions, petty snobberies and subtle distinctions. It was
disciplined and deferential, conformist and hedonistic, patriotic and loyal. It
showed little interest in radical ideologies. It had a vast fund of goodwill
towards Britain` s national institutions, especially the monarchy and
parliament. From the point of view of a hard- pressed government in time of
war, the working class was far from intractable. There was, however, a sticking
point. This was `fairness`, a concept deeply rooted in Anglo-Saxon culture.
Government could ignore `fairness` only at its peril.
(Bourne, 1989, p.
204)
These were the
people the government were given the task of cajoling into acquiescence, people
that had become accustomed to Free Trade, private enterprise and minimal
governmental interference. Despite this scenario however, political Liberalism
was seen to be evolving in response to social problems and the rise of labour,
and the war became “the locomotive” which accelerated the change in British
politics and society.
It was only when
the pressures of war were brought to bear, that the government gradually
abandoned its laissez faire principles in favour of direct control. The goal
was to fight a war, but simultaneously preserve the living standards of the
civilians, so as to uphold morale on the home front and in the factories needed
to supply the military front.
Bourne suggests that:
“The nature of
this interference was characteristic. It involved a series of ad hoc responses
to specific problems. These were made of necessity and not through choice.
There was no overall plan and no philosophy of action.”
(Bourne, 1989,p.
192)
The desperate
need for munitions was an early realisation of the need for state control,
which later extended to shipping in 1916, food in 1917,coal in 1917, and food
rationing in 1918. Both Lloyd George and Asquith` s ministries were reluctant
to affront public opinion, especially the trade unions, consequently a careful
pace was adopted along with the contingency of `returning to normal` at the
conclusion of the war. The government were unwilling and unable to compel men
to join up, and the ability to control labour was even more problematic, due to
the increasing power and self-confidence of the trade unions. The union
ideology was based on free collective bargaining, sensitivity to the
prerogative of its workers and opposition to the introduction of new
technology, consequently Britain lagged behind in production of iron and steel,
coal and chemicals, all of which could be a distinct disadvantage in a war against
its main European competitor.
The British
experience was that it was impossible to fight a major modern war without
compulsory military service. Kitchener `s adherence to a `volunteer conscripts
only` policy until as late as 1916, was probably a factor in prolonging
the war and it became increasingly difficult to maintain the supply of men
for the front, thus the govt resorted to measures, which many saw as a betrayal
of the notion of `fair play.` The
indiscriminate nature of volunteering meant that many `quality` workmen were
enlisting, leaving an acute shortage, especially in the munitions industry.
The Board of
Trade Report on State of Employment in United Kingdom, July 1915 showed that:
“Almost a quarter of the employees in the chemicals and explosives industry had enlisted, as had a similar proportion from electrical engineering; over a fifth had gone from coal-mining and almost as many from the metal trades.”
(Marwick,
1967,p.58)
Marwick further
observed that
“In a `war of machines` it was at least as necessary to look to the supply of machine -makers at home as to the supply of machine-users on the fields of battle.”
(Marwick, 1967,
p.58)
There was an
attempt to alleviate the manpower shortage with the issuing of badges for those
men deemed to be engaged in `essential occupations`, and the compilation of a
National Register for all persons between the ages of fifteen and sixty five in
order to co-ordinate the war effort. Armed with this information, the
government proposed a number of bills which deemed that single men, besides
those who had `attested “ to volunteer if needed, had enlisted and were
eligible for transfer to the Reserve. In light of this inadequate `
semi-conscription`, a new universal conscription Bill was introduced which
eventually became law.
“ The imposition
of universal conscription was an event of central importance in the social
history of the war. It implied a definite swing in the
Government policy from the careful hoarding of its skilled labour to a prodigal
casting of copper, silver and gold into the lottery of the trenches; it meant
that the highly controversial `dilution` which had been designed to maximise
the domestic labour force now became `substitution`, the attempt to release the
able-bodied by employing the less able - bodied.”
(Arthur Marwick,
1967, p.83)
Lloyd George was
compelled to open up hitherto skilled jobs to unskilled labour, and bring women
into industry in vast numbers. The Trade Unions feared an erosion of their
hard-earned power, the erosion of differences between skilled and unskilled
workers, the driving down of wages by unscrupulous employers utilising women.
Both employers
and the government were in a quandary. The former were competing for labour in
a seller` s market and would have to offer higher wages and better working
conditions. The latter would have to co-operate with the Trade Unions and share
political decision-making. The TUC had craved recognition and responsibility
since its inception, and now a golden opportunity had presented itself. The
Treasury Agreement discussed from 17-19 March between Arthur Henderson
and his trade union leader colleagues on one side, and Chancellor of the
Exchequer, Lloyd George and President of the Board of Trade, Walter Runciman on
the other, meant that the unions agreed to `dilution of the restrictive
practices` and compulsory arbitration. The government for their part agreed to
maintain the skilled wage rate even when performed by an unskilled person, and
limit private profits.
“This, however, did not in practice amount to much; for the limitation was only on excess profits above the pre-war level, and the pre-war standards were so defined, by allowing firms to select their most profitable years to form the basis of an average, that munitions firms were not only able to make but also to retain very high profits in spite of the Government` s promise.”
(Cole &
Postgate,1956, p.515)
The new coalition
government at once created the post of Minister in the Ministry of Munitions
for David Lloyd George, and almost immediately sought to legalise the Treasury
Agreement by presenting the Munitions of War Act before the House.
The Ministry of
Munitions was to take control over those factories engaged in war production
under the Defence of the Realm Act, thus suspending trade union practice, in
accordance with the Treasury Agreement, for the duration of the war.
The
suspicion that employers would try to outbid each other for the limited supply
of skilled workers, was addressed by issuing a` leaving certificate` to an
employee to enable him to change his job, if he had been engaged in munitions
work within the previous six weeks, and at the consent of the previous
employer. There was, however, no protection for the worker from dismissal by
the employer, and this procedure became a standing grievance amongst the work
force. Moreover, the certificate interfered with the skilled man` s
opportunities to earn higher wages in view of the labour shortage.
In this way, not
only could the government manage labour and supply the trenches, it could also
select men whose removal from the workforce would be the least detrimental to
war production. Those found guilty of provoking industrial unrest soon found
themselves on the front line. The disruption of war production through strikes
and industrial action was prohibited, and all differences were to be
solved by compulsory arbitration, the Local Munitions Tribunals, a body with
the power to appeal against the refusal of employers to grant
leaving certificates, and to impose fines on workmen who
attempted strike action or hindrance of munitions production.
The Munitions of
War Act gave the ministry extensive powers, which also stretched into the
economy as a whole, power supply and the control of raw materials. The
Ministry` s aim was to encourage good industrial practice, adopt the latest
methods and machinery, hence the conversion to Arc furnaces from Bessamer
converters in the steel industry. Industrial specialisation, research and
development, production analysis and modern systems of financial control were
positively encouraged, and this also gave private manufacturers the opportunity
to effect changes previously blocked by trade union opposition. Many industrial
processes became standardised, new machinery created, and scientific research
was rescued from neglect with encouraging results. However, the government` s
foray into other areas of British industry yielded mixed results. The railways
were taken over to introduce some kind of standardisation amongst the 130
companies. The coal industry meanwhile experienced a `de facto`
nationalisation, which yielded little in the way of technical innovation,
increased productivity or output. The dangerous nature of shipbuilding
restricted women and the unions fought dilution. The drive to adopt good
practice in agriculture yielded few results, farmers did not utilise their new
women workers for one thing, or produce enough to adequately feed the nation
without the imports secured by merchant seamen and their Navy escorts.
The Ministry assumed
the role of industrial employer in its own right, establishing factories with
public funds on specially acquired land, and paying great attention to employee
health and welfare, catering, washing and recreation, which in turn raised the
standards of private manufacturers. Industrial discipline was vital, and there
were fines for poor workmanship, lateness and absenteeism. Sobriety was
promoted by heavy alcohol taxes, the imposition of licensing laws, which
survive to this day, and the rising cost of living was curbed by rent control
(The Rent Restriction Act of 1915) in order to avert strikes, which would
hamper war production. This measure, however, failed to have the desired effect
due to the arbitrary nature of its compulsion, the fact that the loss of
profits would retard new house building and thus lead to overcrowding,
consequently raising the incidence of tuberculosis, and general civil unrest.
The government took responsibility for the incomes of the populace, whose means
had been cut by the war. The post war separation allowances, widow ` s
pensions, ex-servicemen disabled benefits, `making up` the shortfall of cotton
operative` s wages, `dole`, all extended the
government` s responsibilities in the field of income maintenance permanently.
“I am disinclined to admit that all the measures of industrial and commercial organisation adopted during the war, which are commonly lumped together under the term state control, were merely necessary evils to be got rid of as soon as possible and never to be thought of again. A considerable extension of the co-operative and collective enterprise seems to me probable and desirable in times of peace; and I believe that there is something to be learnt from the experiments in state control during the war which may be of positive value in the difficult times ahead.”
(Lloyd, 1924,
preface in Milward, 1984, p. 22)
From mid 1916,
when the Munitions of War Act, and the Military Service Act began to bite,
working hours were increased alongside production targets. The news from The
Front was bad, the Somme, Jutland etc. and a reportedly growing movement for a
negotiated peace, all added to `war-weariness` and the fragile truce between
the workers and their government disappeared in 1917, after a severe winter of
food and fuel shortages sparked a wave of industrial unrest. The strikes were
ended by firmness and concession, and arrests were made under Regulation 42 of
the Defence of The Realm Act (DORA)…”impeding the production of war material “
The leaders were
in fact shop stewards, not the trade union national leaders whose
“collaborationist policies” failed to represent grievances of the local
rank and file, which were first and foremost, the high price of food and its
unequal distribution. Resentment grew as the workers began to feel that they
were suffering disproportionately, their mobility constrained, wages falling
behind prices, whilst the employers were making fat profits that the workers
were entitled to share. The conciliatory nature of wage increases meant in
effect that the improved living standards
“were won through the rising influence of organised labour in both political and industrial sectors”
(Whiteside, 1988,
p. 95)
Moreover, these
conciliatory measures were given against a backdrop of Bolshevik revolution in
Tsarist Russia, the fear of it spreading to Britain, and Russia` s exit
from the war.
On the Clyde,
regarded as a potential hotbed of revolutionary fervour, strikes broke out as
many were complaining that `dilution`, was being extended from government to
private work, and that the practice was not being used to release men for
`essential tasks`, but for `cannon fodder` in the trenches. Thus the services
of women were dispensed with at the end of the war in order to restore
industrial peace.
“Victory went to those nations best able
to mobilise the people and keep them believing in the war.”
(Gerard J De
Groot, 2001,p.135)
Nevertheless,
the movements furthering the rights of both women and trade unions saw an
improvement in their relative positions during the hostilities. The trade union
movement emerged with a great deal of status, self- confidence and power. Its
co-operation during the war effort was vital, the smaller unions amalgamated
into larger ones and some of its leaders found themselves in important
positions in deciding post war matters. The importance of the unions was
reflected in a huge increase in new membership, due in part to the successes of
collective bargaining. The war had shown how direct action was the most useful
method of redressing any perceived grievance.
“The membership grew from 4 million at the start of the war to 6 million at the time of The Armistice, peaking at 8.3 million in 1920- almost half the working population”
(G.R.
Askwith, 1974, pp414-46)
“The extension of the franchise in 1918
and the growth of trade union membership offered the poorer sections of the
working population the chance to preserve the very real gains they had made
during the war. Britain` s workforce emerged from the war more homogenous, less
poverty stricken and more organised than it had been in1914.”
(Whiteside, 1988,
p. 96)
Women had always
worked in light industrial and domestic spheres, but the imposition of male
conscription gave women an opportunity to move into traditionally male preserves.
In many cases these were not `new` workers:
“Contrary to propaganda reports of the time there was no enormous influx of non-working women into men` s jobs: millions of working class women in Britain moved into different trades when the opportunity arose.”
(Gail Braybon,
2000, p.154)
The effect
of this was that the disparity between male and female wages was eroded from
half to two-thirds the male wage by the end of the war. The post war years saw
trade unionists remaining hostile to the principal of equal pay for equal work,
and as many as “two thirds of the women who entered employment during the
war had left it by 1920.”
(Bourne, 1989,p.
197)
Keith Robbins
suggests that there was an expectation amongst women that their war work was a
temporary measure, and this probably suited many women who wanted to return `to
normal` as soon as possible. Almost as a reward for their unstinting
effort, parliament introduced the Representation of the People Act in February
1918, which in effect extended the franchise to all women aged 30. By
this stage Robbins argues:
“The losses sustained in the war made it apparent that there was important work ahead for women. Perhaps it was the case that the factory turned their sex into one united family- a surrogate experience for the trenches, it was claimed-but when peace returned there was an undoubted need for the reproduction of real families.”
(Robbins, 1985,
p.161)
Some saw it as a hollow victory, but the suffragettes saw it as the first step to full voting equality
with men. The same year saw the emergence of the Sex Discrimination Act, and by
1921, women were allowed into the jury service, the magistracy, the legal
profession, and Nursing was given professional status.
The gains were
not perhaps particularly revolutionary, but they were a start, but a lot of
ground gained during the war was lost upon the return of the soldiers. However,
there were continuing opportunities in clerical work and fresh ones
in the higher professions. Women` s maternal and welfare provisions were
improved in factories that hitherto failed to cater for factory acts, due to
the belief that to legislate for the adult male reflected on his manhood.
but perhaps the most important development in hindsight was the significant
change in the belief of women, and indeed society, of what they were capable
of.
“Now that they were earning on their own account, they had economic independence; now that they were working away from home,…they had social independence. Above all, in their awareness that they were performing arduous and worthwhile tasks, were living through experiences once confined only to the most adventurous males, they gained a new self-consciousness and a new sense of status.”
(Arthur Marwick,
1967, p.99)
Alan S. Milward
cites A.L. Bowley in his analysis of this change,
“The economic
position of women and their more complete enfranchisement, would no doubt have
developed in a different manner if their claims had not been substantiated by
their ability to replace men.”
(A.L. Bowley,
1930, p. 22)
However, De
Groot maintains that the fact that women were still paid less than men when
doing the same job increased tension between the sexes and did nothing for
equality. They never attained the status of skilled workers, the real source of
power in the labour hierarchy, and were consequently expendable. Many women
were contented to return to their homes after the war, and very few found the
opportunities to take advantage of their greater self-esteem. Their work in the
munitions industry was not universally welcomed and few concessions were made
regarding separate changing and washing facilities.
“There is a
serious flaw in the argument that women can gain status in society taking up
men` s jobs. Status in a patriarchal society is calculated according to a
male-orientated measure of importance. If a job becomes essentially `women` s work`, it` s status declines,
a decline highlighted by the lower pay attached to it.”
(De Groot, 2001 p
156)
The returning
clerks saw their jobs had been taken by women in their absence at the front,
and consequently declined to return to them as they were now cast-off jobs to
be left to women, who were paid less.
“Britain witnessed perhaps the least disruption to civilian society during the war. Living standards were maintained and the centralised distribution of food supplies and rationing ensured that diet and nutrition, notably amongst the poorest in society, improved dramatically. British workers gained by the war, using their role in war production to force improved pay and conditions, as well as a greater participation in government.”
(Cawood
& McKinnon- Bell, 2001, p. 53)
Arthur
Marwick`s thesis, however innovative and valid, was formed almost thirty-five
years ago, and revisionist historians now feel that Marwick has perhaps over
emphasised change at the expense of tradition.
“Thirty years later, these excessively sanguine theories of war and society seem over-cooked. War had some profound (even positive) effects, but it is reckless to postulate an all- embracing theory of war and its effects on society. In more stable societies like Britain and France, forces of conservatism and tradition were probably equal to the challenges of war. When one studies World War One, needs to be aware not just of the forces of change. but also of the countervailing forces which constrained or absorbed change. Progress was profound, but so was the power of convention, tradition, authority, repression and nostalgia.”
(Gerard J De
Groot, 2001, p.155)
De Groot further
points out that the progress made by the workers depended on labour shortage,
and that this power only lasted as long as the vagaries of the trade cycle were
favourable. Workers willingly made sacrifices for the good of the country but
`only for the duration` and De Groot finds it is hard to see a group of people
who sacrificed their lives and their rights to be seen as making progress.
“War is an extraordinary event which engenders a temporary tolerance for disruption. With the armistice comes a widespread desire, amongst all classes, to return to normal. The extent to which normality is restored is the gauge of how worthwhile the sacrifice was. War is seldom fought to change society, but more often to preserve it.”
De Groot
p.158-159)
In returning to
the question at hand, it seems that the British people were prepared to go
along with the increase in government intervention for the duration of the
war, and to extricate as many concessions from the government as possible in
this period, but it was only for a mutually understood period commensurate with
the duration of the war. The British public were conservative in their views,
and fought the war, as De Groot stated, to preserve society. Just because
the government had been effective running the war, it did n` t mean they would
be as effective running the peace.
“The degree of state control eventually achieved during the course of the war was striking and impressive. It encompassed all Britain` s basic industries. The British people showed remarkable readiness to accommodate themselves to the fact of this change. This readiness was not, however, extended to the question of principle. State control was not an idea whose time had come, but an exceptional measure for exceptional circumstances, to be abandoned when the world returned to its senses. The power of the responsibilities of government increase, but the nature of The State was not transformed”.
(Bourne, 1989,p.
193)
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